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We examine Harold Demsetz’s (1967) prediction that property rights emerge and are 
refined as the benefits of doing so exceed the costs in the context of oil and gas resources 
in t he U.S.  Familiar influences on the development of petroleum property rights, 
technology, market demand, and politics, provide support for the hypothesis, and those 
issues are examined.  Our primary contribution is to demonstrate the important role of a 
less familiar factor, the presence in the reservoir of both oil and gas with differentially 
volatile prices. This factor has affected the nature of the property rights assigned with 
unitization, an institutional arrangement to internalize the common pool externality. 
Information asymmetries and conflicting price expectations have resulted in unit 
agreements that would not have been predicted in a strict neo-classical sense.  Our 
analysis provides new insights regarding the nature of voluntary unitization contracts, 
inherent limits to producers’ ability to internalize externalities, and the welfare 





                                                           
* The authors thank Carol Rose and Richard Epstein for valuable suggestions as well as participants at the 
Conference on the Evolution of Property Rights, Northwestern University School of Law, April 20-22, 
2001.  The authors also thank Jacqueline McLelland for assistance in preparing the final manuscript. The 
authors also thank the International Center for Economic Research (Turin, Italy) for support.        1
I.  INTRODUCTION. 
  In 1967, Harold Demsetz advanced the thesis that development of property rights 
flows from underlying changes in the relative prices of goods and the technologies that 
are used to produce them.  Institutional change takes place whenever there are net gains 
from doing so, and through this process new property rights are created to replace those 
no longer attuned to economic conditions.  Demsetz noted, however, that the actual 
arrangement adopted depends upon transactions costs and preferences for state or private 
ownership.
1 The empirical richness of this well-known hypothesis is in the 
straightforward link between the existence of property rights and underlying economic 
forces.  Even more important, these same forces account for the specific form of property 
rights, or what Demsetz calls the “coalescing of property rights into particular bundles 
and to the determination of the ownership structure that will be associated with these 
bundles.”
2 
We apply this framework to describe the evolution of property rights and 
regulatory arrangements in the extraction of petroleum and natural gas from common 
pools in the U nited States as relative prices, knowledge, and technology changed.  
Whereas the theory of oil and gas property rights and complications introduced by 
migratory hydrocarbons and the rule of capture have been discussed before, our 
examination of the impact on the problem of having both oil and natural gas in a reservoir 
is new.
3 Although we find an evolutionary pattern that generally corroborates Demsetz’ 
                                                           
1 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Amer. Econ. Rev. 350 (1967). 
2 Demsetz, supra note 1, at 347. 
3 See, for example, Charles Donahue, Jr., Thomas E. Kauper, and Peter W. Martin, Property: An 
Introduction to the Concept and the Institution (1974, 325-59). For additional discussion of the common 
law rule of capture, see Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Unitization of Oil and Gas Fields in Texas: A Study of 
Legislative, Administrative, and Judicial Policies (1986); and Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession 
and the Design of the Law, 38 J. Law & Econ. 393 (1995).        2
predictions, we show how the process of institutional change is affected by political 
demands from competing constituencies in ways not anticipated using a strict balancing 
of economic costs and benefits. We also identify a further complication: it is not just 
technology and the level of prices, but the unpredictability (volatility) of relative prices 
that has shaped the development of property rights to petroleum resources in the United 
States. Finally, our analysis reveals an important distinction, in terms of property rights 
and the efficiency of resulting contracts, between compulsory and voluntary unitization 
that has not been understood previously.
4   
Although unitization has been recognized as an effective contractual arrangement 
to reduce the losses associated with common pool extraction, its implementation has not 
been smooth.
5 Many parties have resisted unitizing reservoirs and assigning field 
operations to a single firm with all others holding shares in the net revenues of 
production. Negotiations may take years. To facilitate initial agreement, unitization 
contracts often purposefully distinguish between multiple participating areas and/or time-
phases of production in assigning property rights. These practices, however, can result in 
subsequent discord and rent dissipation if the arrangements become inconsistent with 
apparent efficient production from the unit. In face of these problems, state governments 
have adopted legislation to force unitization via majority rules.  Shares in the unit become 
                                                           
4 The legal, economic, and engineering commentary and analyses of the earliest and most influential 
advocates of unitization (for example, John F. Carll, Henry L. Doherty, Ray Lyman Wilbur, Robert R. 
Penn, J. Edgar Pew, W. P. Z. German, T. Murray Robinson, Joe S. Bain, and Stephen L. McDonald) 
suggest nothing like the formation of the “partitioned” units which are commonplace today. 
5 Unitization is discussed in a variety of places.  For example, see Stephen L. McDonald, Petroleum 
Conservation in the United States: An Economic Analysis (1971); James L. Smith, The Common Pool, 
Bargaining, and the Rule of Capture, 25 Econ. Inq. 631 (1987); and Gary D. Libecap, Unitization, in The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 641 (Peter Newman ed. 1998), and is examined in 
more detail in Gary D. Libecap and James L. Smith, The Self-Enforcing Provisions of Oil and Gas Unit 
Operating Agreements: Theory and Evidence, 15 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 526 (1999), and Gary D. Libecap 
and James L. Smith, Regulatory Remedies to the Common Pool: The Limits to Oil Field Unitization, 22 
Energy J. 1 (2001).        3
new property rights, replacing those held under common pool extraction. In this manner, 
the regulatory process has affected the development of property rights, but as we show, 
the welfare effects are not as straightforward as the Demsetz framework suggests.  In 
particular, when the coercive power of the state is used to force trades and unitization 
when there are separate holdings of oil and natural gas in the reservoir, the parties may 
not be made better off.
6  Hence, what otherwise appears to be an obvious government 
solution to a breakdown in private bargaining fails to bring a Pareto improvement.  
Our analysis expands on a point raised, but not really developed by Demsetz: “In 
general, transacting costs can be large relative to the gains because of ‘natural’ 
difficulties, difficulties in trading, or they can be large because of legal reasons.”
7  The 
development of property rights in oil and gas reservoirs encountered all three problems: 
“natural” difficulties because of geological conditions, difficulties in trading because of 
volatile relative prices and asymmetric information, and regulatory-imposed difficulties. 
II.  COMMON POOL EXTRACTION AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
PETROLEUM PROPERTY RIGHTS. 
In the history of oil and gas development in the United States there were four 
distinct property rights scenarios, each with its own costs and benefits, that provided 
alternative “resolutions” of the common pool production externality:  (1)  extractive 
anarchy, in which actions by individual producers intending to exploit the rule of capture 
go unrestrained; (2)  conservation regulation, in  which government  prohibits  producers  
                                                           
6 While it is sometimes possible for private parties to ward off damage stemming from regulatory actions 
via the takings clause, this is an unlikely remedy for the cases we consider where there are differential 
holdings of oil and gas and the prices of the two substances are not highly correlated, frustrating voluntary 
trades.  Forced exchanges through mandated unitization typically involve a perceived increase in the risk of 
future loss, rather than immediate harm to tangible property. 
7 Demsetz, supra note 1, at 348.        4
from engaging in specific wasteful actions that anarchy might invite; (3) buy-outs, in 
which a single producer purchases all others’ holdings in the common pool and thus 
internalizes the externality; and (4) unitization, in which the separate producers exchange 
their individual holdings in the reservoir for shares of a single, commonly managed 
enterprise that encompasses the entire pool.  The first two categories characterized early 
U.S. production, while the later, especially unitization, characterizes the more recent 
period.  
Beginning in 1859, adjacent producers separately extracted oil from the same 
reservoir with no coordinated production plans.  The nature and extent of the externalities 
involved were not well understood. Knowledge and vision of the subterranean reservoir 
and related principles of fluid extraction were rudimentary with little appreciation of 
common pools or the geophysical mechanisms that propelled oil to the surface through a 
well bore.
8 Because of the fugitive nature of subterranean oil and gas, in situ property 
rights were not assigned to surface land owners as was done with fixed subsurface 
mineral resources, but rather granted only upon extraction or capture as was done with 
wild animals (minerals ferae naturae).
9 Every surface owner had the right to vigorously 
extract oil and gas to reduce it to his possession without violating the rights of 
neighboring surface owners.  
                                                           
8 DeGolyer’s conclusion: “A study of oil production in Pennsylvania suggests the industry had to reach its 
majority before, out of the welter of misunderstood and neglected observations, there began to emerge a 
rational understanding of the occurrence of oil and gas.”  See E. DeGolyer, Concepts of Occurrence of Oil 
and Gas, in History of Petroleum Engineering 17 (1961).  Baker and Hardwicke expressed the same view in 
characterizing the judicial outcome of an oil field dispute:  “The Pennsylvania court as late as 1907, being 
46 years after the completion of the Drake Well, declared that meager information existed as to oil and gas 
pools, as to reactions following production, and as to the extent and direction of migration of oil or gas.”  
See Rex G. Baker and Robert E. Hardwicke, Conservation, in History of Petroleum Engineering 1120 
(1961). 
9 Donahue, Kauper, and Martin, supra note 3 at 326.        5
This practice led to extractive anarchy. Anarchy prevailed initially not because the 
resource value was low relative to the cost of alternative arrangements, but because there 
was insufficient technological basis and understanding for identifying what a coordinated 
solution might be.  
Indeed, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the economic value of 
petroleum was high enough to raise concern about apparent wastage and damage to 
adjacent property. In 1910 up to 11 percent of California’s (a major producing state) 
annual oil output was lost due to fire while in surface storage.  In 1914 the Director of the 
Bureau of Mines estimated that the costs of excessive wells equaled about a quarter of the 
value of total annual U.S. oil production.
10 As early as 1893, state legislation was enacted 
in Indiana to limit the unconfined venting of oil or gas into the air. In Ohio Oil Co. v. 
Indiana (177 U.S. 190, 1899), the Supreme Court upheld this regulation as proper 
legislative authority to “prevent the waste of the common property of the surface 
owners.”
11  
This waste stimulated research into the nature of reservoir mechanics and more 
efficient resource recovery.  Many of the ideas that emerged were slow to gain 
                                                           
10 George Stocking, The Oil Industry and the Competitive System (1925), and John Ise, The United States 
Oil Policy (1926) at 141; and American Petroleum Institute, Petroleum Facts and Figures 166 (1951). See 
also Gary D. Libecap and Steven N. Wiggins, Contractual Responses to the Common Pool: Prorationing of 
Crude Oil Production, 74 Amer. Econ. Rev. 88 (1984) for estimates of the rental losses involved.  
11 177 U.S. 210.  On the face of it, the ruling in Ohio Oil Co. primarily advances state regulation to restrain 
private extraction from the common pool, for the common good.  As it turns out, however, the effect of the 
Indiana regulation was somewhat more complex.  At least in part, it advantaged Indiana-based natural gas 
producers who sought to limit the venting of natural gas by the oil producing, Ohio Oil Company.  See 
Richard A. Epstein, “The Modern Uses of Ancient Law,” 48 S.C.L. Rev. 243 (1997).  The asymmetrical 
distribution of gains and losses from regulation was a harbinger of problems to come.  As emphasized in 
this paper, differential production incentives between oil and gas producers who have skewed holdings of 
the two substances have been a major source of regulatory conflict.  Compensating reciprocal exchanges 
often have not been possible because the prices of the two substances are not highly correlated, leading to 
disputes over the terms of trade.  These issues are developed more thoroughly below.        6
acceptance.
12 Nevertheless, by the time the first petroleum engineering degree was 
formally awarded at the University of Pittsburgh in 1915 there was a technical 
understanding of the impact of “overdrilling” on the hydrodynamic reservoir system.
13  It 
was known, for example, that drilling a second well in close proximity to the first would 
interfere with the first well’s ability to draw fluids up through the well bore (and vice 
versa) and that the extent of such interference could be anticipated according to the laws 
of physics.  Perhaps more significantly, it became known that drilling too many wells in 
particular parts of a reservoir could cause reservoir water or gas to break through the 
producing column of oil, thus trapping significant volumes of unrecoverable oil.
14 
With this scientific knowledge there was a basis for negotiations among private 
parties to mitigate the effects of the externality.  Whether in the form of buy-outs that 
would have placed the reservoir under single ownership or other private negotiations 
leading to cooperative restraints on individual drilling programs, one might have 
expected the rapid development of either of these arrangements to address the common 
pool.
15  In fact, neither tended to be selected because of high transaction costs in reaching 
a negotiated settlement.  The typical number of stakeholders on a single reservoir was  
sufficient  to  hinder multilateral  negotiations  and  raise  bargaining  costs to  prohibitive  
                                                           
12 F. A. Johnson, who received his petroleum engineering degree in 1915, described his early experience as 
follows:  “The road of the petroleum engineer like that of the geologist was not easy in the early days when 
both, practicing in the same field of geology, endeavored to convince the hard headed operator that he was 
a useful asset in his business.”  Quoted by C. A. Warner, Sources of Men, in History of Petroleum 
Engineering 48 (1961). 
13 C. A. Warner, supra note 11, at 47. 
14 Contemporary estimates from the early part of the twentieth century place the average recovery of oil at 
only 10-20% of the total resource in place, but in many cases it would have been much less than this overall 
average.  Joseph E. Pogue, Economics of Petroleum 343 (1921). 
15 As Demsetz (supra note 1, at 357) observed in a different context: “Two market options are open to the 
negotiators.  The first is simply to try to reach a contractual agreement among owners that directly deals 
with the external effects at issue.  The second option is for some owners to buy out others, thus changing 
the parcel size owned.  Which option is selected will depend on which is cheaper.”        7
levels.  Some representative figures illustrate the problem.  On the Yates, Hendrick, and 
Seminole fields of Texas and Oklahoma, all discovered in the 1920s, there were 
respectively, 16, 18, and 40 different firms with extraction leases. And on the huge East 
Texas field, because of many small surface landowners, over 1,000 firms were competing 
for its oil by 1933.
16 Other fields, such as Long Beach and Oklahoma City, were 
fragmented by production from town lots. The conflicting strategic bargaining positions 
of so many independent agents, compounded by the problem of holdouts, posed 
insurmountable difficulties in designing coordinated production programs that would 
have involved the assignment of some type of property right to subsurface petroleum.
17  
Moreover, incomplete and asymmetric information regarding the potential value of 
respective tracts constrained the assembling of leases into a single tract through 
purchase.
18 As a result, early efforts to address the common pool externality through 
property rights definition turned from private solutions to state regulation. 
  State regulation to limit the drilling of wells and the extraction of oil and gas first 
developed with the advent of major new discoveries in Oklahoma and Texas during the 
1920s and 1930s.  These regulations necessarily restricted the rights of producers to 
extract from the common pool, and importantly, they also limited the scope for 
negotiating private contracts. By stipulating the number of wells to be sunk, well spacing, 
pooling, and production quotas, state regulation affected lease values and the range of 
exchanges  possible in  private negotiations. These  regulations  were supported  by  some  
                                                           
16 Libecap and Wiggins, supra note 9, at 89-94. 
17 “Indeed, an increase in the number of owners is an increase in the communality of property and leads, 
generally, to an increase in the cost of internalizing,” from Demsetz, supra note 1, at 357. 
18 Some of the problems of asymmetric information in valuing leases are addressed in Steven N. Wiggins 
and Gary D. Libecap, Oil Field Unitization: Contractual Failure in the Presence of Imperfect Information, 
75 Amer. Econ. Rev. 368 (1985).        8
producers, resisted by others, and the property rights that emerged were molded by 
political factors. The compromises necessary to build a political consensus for regulation 
ultimately weakened its ability to address the common pool externality.  
The Texas Railroad Commission and other state regulatory agencies set monthly 
statewide production levels and allocated the total among regulated wells.  The total 
volume of “allowable” production was determined in accordance with estimates of 
supply and demand consistent with a targeted oil price.  Prorationing rules were issued, 
setting total field production levels, which were then allocated among individual wells 
according to their quotas.  The production rules were applied uniformly to all fields, even 
though each oil field had a unique physical configuration and optimum production 
potential.  The structure of property rights induced by this regulation raised production 
costs relative to what might have occurred with alternative designs.  In Texas, the 
numerous, very high-cost wells (stripper wells) were exempted from production controls 
altogether.  Among regulated wells, per-well quotas were based on acreage and depth, but 
the Commission gave more weight to depth, encouraging firms with limited leased 
acreage to drill deeper.  Minimum spacing rules were adopted to limit overall drilling, but 
the Commission routinely granted exemptions to small firms.  Indeed, in 1946, a Texas 
court ruled that small leaseholders had the right to drill at least one well on their land 
with sufficient monthly quota to cover drilling and operating costs.
19   
These per-well  quotas (allowables) were  property rights, and  while encouraging  
                                                           
19 Railroad Commission v. Humble Oil and Refining Co. (193 S.W. 2
nd 824, March 1946). For discussion of 
the political pressures in Texas to protect high-cost producers, see Gary D. Libecap, The Political Economy 
of Crude Oil Cartelization in the United States, 1933-1972, 49 J. Econ. Hist. 851 (1989, 850-54).  State 
regulation of oil is discussed by Robert Bradley, Oil, Gas, and Government: The U.S. Experience 851 
(1996).        9
waste, they became a common feature of state regulation.  They reflected the political 
influence in Texas of the numerous very small producers that had limited leased acreage 
and many wells.  Without concessions, the producers of small, high-cost, and marginal 
wells refused to agree to state controls.  Absent their participation, state regulation would 
have brought little improvement over anarchy in the fields.  The opportunity cost of 
resulting imperfections in the design of the prorationing scheme has been examined by 
Adelman (1964), among others, and found to have been substantial, probably exceeding 
$2 billion per year by the early 1960s.
20  Despite all this, state regulation of minimum 
well spacing and maximum rates of production from individual wells was effective in 
reducing the cost of the production externality relative to competitive extraction.   
III.  Unitization and the Trading of In-Situ Property Rights 
Unitization became an increasingly popular alternative response to the common 
pool by the late 1940s and early 1950s, as reliance on secondary recovery techniques 
grew.
21  By that time, new discoveries had diminished, and the industry was turning more 
to extracting additional oil from mature reservoirs through secondary recovery.  Injecting 
water, gas, or other fluids into particular zones of a partially depleted reservoir can 
rebuild subsurface pressures and push oil to the surface.  The process requires that 
selected producing wells (where selection is dictated by the configuration of the 
reservoir) be converted to injection wells, and that additional injection (non-producing) 
wells be drilled at certain locations—all  this  for  the benefit of increased production that  
                                                           
20 M. A. Adelman, Efficiency of Resource Use in Crude Petroleum, 31 South. Econ. J. 101 (1964).  See 
also G. Campbell Watkins, Conservation and Economic Efficiency: Alberta Oil Proration, 4 J. Envr. Econ. 
& Mgmt. 40 (1977). 
21 Herman H. Kaveler, Unitization, in History of Petroleum Engineering 1182 (1961).        10
will materialize from wells located in other, possibly distant, parts of the formation.  To 
ensure success, this scheme requires private owners to negotiate contracts for cooperative 
exploitation of the reservoir.  Importantly, existing conservation regulation that mainly 
circumscribed the rights of individual producers did little to facilitate such cooperation. 
Unitization contracts, in contrast, linked the entire formation and placed it under the 
management of a single firm, which promoted primary and secondary recovery.  These 
contracts were difficult to write due to disagreements over the shares or property rights to 
be assigned to the various firms that would give up the right to independently produce 
under the rule of capture.  Accordingly, state governments began to intervene with new 
laws and regulations designed to promote unitization.   
The first step was to adopt so-called “unitization assistance” laws.  These 
measures provided anti-trust exemptions and conferred certain rights on majority owners 
to impose cooperative oil field development programs on minority holdouts.  The right to 
impose unitized operations on dissenting minorities became known as compulsory or 
statutory unitization, and approximately half of the states with unitization assistance 
statutes awarded this right of compulsion to majority owners.
22   
In Oklahoma compulsory unitization legislation was enacted in 1945.  It stated 
that once 85 percent of the leases approved unitization, the remainder could be forced to 
join.
23  Small firms resisted the new law, challenged it in court, and attempted repeal in 
1947.  By 1951, however, opposition to compulsory unitization in  Oklahoma was largely  
                                                           
22 State surveys of compulsory unitization provisions are presented in James E. Russell, Forrest E. 
Hoglund, and Granville Dutton, Statutory Unitization: The Engineering Aspects of an Energy Recovery 
Measure (Society of Petroleum Engineers Paper #3965, 1972), and Dean Lueck, Petroleum Conservation 
and the Statutory Overthrow of the Common Law (unpublished working paper, 1997). 
23 1945 Oklahoma Session Laws at 162.        11
spent, and the original law was amended with little controversy to lower the required 
majority from 85 to 63 percent.
24  In Texas, however, small firms resisted the loss of the 
regulatory advantages afforded them through the state’s prorationing regulation, and 
because of their large number and political influence, Texas was never able to adopt a 
compulsory unitization law.
25   
  If unit contracts are to succeed at internalizing the common pool externality, they 
must award to each owner a fixed share of all production and costs associated with the 
reservoir.  Such an arrangement makes each party a residual claimant to reservoir-wide 
rents, and reconciles individual incentives with those of the group to maximize the value 
of the reservoir as a whole.  Under these circumstances, unit shareholders hold property 
rights to an undivided share of the petroleum in situ, thereby negating the impact of the 
rule-of-capture.   
This fundamental principle of unitized development breaks down when any 
shareowner is allocated different portions of unit costs and revenues, and intense conflict 
may result. Consider in the extreme, the position of an owner who is allocated 100 
percent of all production, but 0 percent of the costs.  That owner would then champion 
any incremental investment that increases production from the reservoir, no matter how 
small and regardless of cost or the impact on the profits of other owners. Below we 
examine why these unbalanced allocations were agreed to in some unit contracts.  This 
type of dispute within the unit is not unlike the conflict that arises between royalty 
interest owners (typically surface property owners), who bear no costs  of production, and  
                                                           
24 1951 Oklahoma Session Laws at 136. 
25 Gary D. Libecap and Steven N. Wiggins, The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: 
The Case of Oil Field Unitization, 93 J. Polit. Econ. 708 (1985).        12
working interest owners (producing firms), who do.  For example, in  Kingwood Oil 
Company  v. Kenneth C. Bell (244 F.2d 115; 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 4828; 7 Oil & Gas 
Rep. 779) an economically sound secondary recovery operation was blocked by the 
working interest owner’s obligation to carry  all costs for a 50 percent royalty owner.  
This stipulation effectively doubled the cost per barrel on the working interest owner’s 
share of the proposed enhanced recovery, making it much less financially attractive.
26  
Many unit contracts that emerged after 1950 deviated from the ideal form of 
fixed, reservoir-wide cost and revenue shares.  This was especially the case for units 
covering reservoirs containing both oil and natural gas.
27 Such reservoirs were frequent 
since 63 percent of the largest U.S. oil fields contained significant volumes of natural gas 
along with oil.
28 In reservoirs with both oil and gas the parties typically first partitioned 
the reservoir into separate participating areas or PAs, such as the “gas cap” and “oil rim” 
and then negotiated distinct shares for themselves within each PA.  In these “dual PA 
units” each owner was granted a fixed share in costs and benefits, but a share in the gas 
cap often  deviated significantly from the share in the oil rim. Unit contracts also 
commonly assigned different cost and revenue allocations during primary and secondary 
phases of production, leading to “multi-phase units.” Table 1 reveals that of 60 sampled 
unit agreements written in the U.S. and Canada, 33 (or 55 percent) were partitioned in 
either of these two ways.
29  
                                                           
26Although renegotiating problematic lease terms may allow field development to proceed, the need for 
such re-negotiation itself represents an incremental cost of development that in some cases may be 
sufficient to discourage the undertaking. The main difference between the situation described in the text 
and unitization is that royalty owners typically have no direct authority over operating decisions.  They can 
influence them, however, through royalty requirements.  
27 Libecap and Smith, Self-Enforcing Provisions, supra note 5. 
28 See Richard Nehring, The Discovery of Significant Oil and Gas Fields in the United States (1981). 
29 Libecap and Smith, Self-Enforcing Provisions, supra note 5 at 526.        13
  Share partitions in dual PA units fail to completely internalize the production 
externality.
30 A firm with a 100 percent share of the oil rim and another with 100 percent 
of the gas cap have different development incentives for the entire reservoir, and conflicts 
result.  Whatever gas remains in the reservoir at a given time can be used to force oil 
through porous rock to the well bore.  Hence, oil rim owners prefer to delay production of 
gas and reinject it into the reservoir as an oil drive. Gas cap owners, who have no share in 
the enhanced production of oil, prefer immediate production of the gas.  Only if an 
owner’s share were constant across both partitions would he favor the course of action 
that maximizes the value of the combined production of oil and gas. 
Despite this potential for conflict, dual PA unit contracts were written because of 
inherent difficulty in trading the newly created unit property rights to in situ oil and gas. 
Because future  relative prices were uncertain, the respective owners held disparate 
expectations about lease values and often were unable to reach agreement on overall unit 
shares.
31  
To see the problem suppose the leases of the “gas cap owner” covered 80 percent 
of the total gas resource within the reservoir, but only 40 percent of the oil, whereas the 
“oil rim owner” held the remaining 20 percent of the gas and 60 percent of the oil.
32  
There are many possible agreements between the two that would unitize the reservoir (for 
example, a  50/50  allocation  of  all costs and benefits between them, or 55/45 in favor of  
                                                           
30 Multi-phase units typically do not involve the same problems.  See Libecap and Smith, Self-Enforcing 
Provisions, supra note 5. 
31 Although oil and natural gas compete to a limited degree in some uses, their prices are not highly 
correlated, as shown below in Figure 3. For further discussion, see Libecap and Smith, Regulatory 
Remedies, supra note 5. 
32 Unbalanced holdings of this type, which are common in practice, result from a skewed distribution of 
leases relative to the underlying deposit and the non-homogeneous placement of oil and gas accumulations 
within the geological structure.        14
the gas cap owner, and so on), but each of these alternatives requires that the gas cap 
owner exchange gas for a greater portion of oil.  In the end, the gas cap owner must hold 
a uniform share in both oil and gas, or else the reservoir will not be effectively unitized.  
Uniform shares in both resources align the interests of the owners in the maximization of 
the economic value of the reservoir, rather than to maximize the separate value of oil or 
gas. 
The terms of trade governing this exchange are subject to bargaining, but because 
the gas cap owner started with proportionately more gas than oil, the direction of trade is 
determined by the initial allocation.  If the parties hold divergent views regarding relative 
prices of the oil and gas, however, it is possible that no terms of trade can achieve mutual 
approval.  For example, if the gas cap owner believes that the relative value of each unit 
of gas is 3 (in terms of oil), while the oil rim owner believes the relative value is 2, the 
former would demand at least 3 units of oil in exchange for each unit of gas, but the latter 
would willingly provide  at most 2 units of oil in exchange.  An impasse can result, 
blocking complete unitization. 
Figure 1 describes the initial holdings and price expectations of the two parties 
and delineates the set of feasible trades under these circumstances.  The gas gap owner, 
starting at point E with 80 percent of the gas resource, would be willing to exchange at 
the rate of 1 unit of gas for 3 in oil, moving up the steeper of the two trading lines shown 
in the figure.  He would refuse worse offers, which lie to the left and are shaded 
horizontally.  He would accept offers to exchange at rates better than 3:1, which lie to the 
right of the trading line and are free of horizontal shading.  The goal of the trade is to 
reach the diagonal line where oil and gas shares are equalized.  The oil rim owner, also        15
starting at point E, but with just 20 percent of the gas, would be willing to acquire gas at 
the rate of 1 gas for 2 oil, moving up the flatter of the two trading lines.  He would refuse 
worse offers (shown by vertical shading) and welcome better.  As indicated, the only 
feasible trades are those in the unshaded portion of Figure 1, below and to the right of 
point E.  These trades, however, have the gas cap owner expanding his interest in gas and 
reducing his interest in oil, a process that carries the parties away from unitized shares in 
the reservoir.  In the limit, the final outcome might place all the gas with the gas cap 
owner and all the oil with the oil rim owner.  Thus, divergent beliefs regarding relative 
prices could foreclose the p ossibility of unitizing the reservoir and lead instead to 
separate partitioned ownership of the two resources.
33 
  This adverse result can only arise when there are two or more reservoir substances 
that differ in kind and value.  If there is only oil in the reservoir and the parties disagree 
on its value, there is no similar obstacle to a complete buyout by the party holding the 
higher expectation of value, and thereby achieving unitization by default.
34  Accordingly, 
uncertain relative prices of oil and natural gas from the same reservoir led firms to create 
separate bundles of property rights within the reservoir, rather than a single right to all in 
situ resources. 
 
                                                           
33 Some dual-resource common pool problems may be susceptible to partitioning for technological reasons, 
as well.  For example, fisheries that consist of mixed species (for example, shrimp and red snapper) tend to 
be exploited simultaneously by competing technologies that attract different groups of fishermen with little 
in common.  We suspect that dissimilarities and/or unfamiliarities that stem from these technological 
differences would raise further hurdles to effective unitization of the common pool. 
34 When a subjective difference in valuation applies to a single asset, as in Buchanan and Faith’s extension 
of Coase’s rancher/farmer example, either buyouts by the more optimistic party, or the operation of a 
liability rule in place of property rights, may resolve the externality without stifling investment.  When the 
valuation of two assets are at issue, as in our case, and a system of strict property rights exists in the form 
of the rule of capture, buyouts and liability rules do not suffice.  See James M. Buchanan and Roger L. 
Faith, Entrepreneurship and the Internalization of Externalities, 24 J. Law & Econ. 95 (1981).        16
  Separate partitions also can occur even when the respective owners hold identical 
expectations regarding the relative values of oil and gas. So long as relative values are 
volatile and uncertain, attaching financial risk to each party’s holding, and the parties are 
risk-averse, then there is no assurance that any of the feasible trades available to the 
parties will lead to unitization, with the gas cap owner having an equal interest in both 
gas and oil.  The problem is that, while the parties value the efficiency of unitized 
management obtained through equal shares, they also value the efficient distribution of 
risk among owners obtained through diversified holdings.  These two goals could conflict 
as illustrated in Figure 2, and only by coincidence would the efficient allocation of risk 
between the two parties coincide with a unitized apportionment of equity in the reservoir. 
To see the problem, start again from the initial endowment point E in Figure 2, 
where the gas cap owner holds 80 percent of the gas.  He would be willing to exchange 
gas for oil, but only at an ever-increasing price as his gas  holding diminishes.  The 
upward-curved line represents these trades.  All trades to the left of this line marked by 
horizontal shading make the gas cap owner worse off relative to the initial endowment 
and would be refused.  The oil rim owner is in a similar position, willing to trade to 
acquire gas, but only at an ever decreasing price as his holding of gas grows, as reflected 
by the downward-curved line.  All trades to the right of this line shown by vertical 
shading would be judged inferior to point E and therefore refused by the oil rim owner.  
The only mutually agreeable trades are confined to the small, unshaded disc, which does 
carry the parties in the direction of unitized holdings indicated by the diagonal line, but 
stops short of reaching it.  Any feasible trade has the gas cap owner retaining a higher 
interest in gas than oil, again resulting in dual participating areas.  The distinct resources        17
simply could not be pooled.  But this arrangement with separate partitions and different 
allocations of costs and revenues within each partition fails to completely internalize the 
production externality.
35 
  To address the “non-internalized” portion of the production externality, 
partitioned unitization agreements typically included other contractual provisions that 
committed the parties to actions designed to balance the interests of the owners and 
circumvent potential conflicts.  For example, many dual PA units included some agreed-
to provisions for reinjecting produced gas back into the reservoir and delimiting the 
timing of major gas sales.  In multi-phase units, there were provisions that delineated the 
timing of transition from primary recovery to secondary recovery and the revised 
allocations that went with them.
36 
  Indeed, as envisioned by Demsetz, by the time a unitization agreement had been 
signed, the owners had already engaged in many exchanges or “Coasian trades.”  If the 
oil rim owners really believed, for example, that the gas was more valuable if left in the 
reservoir to boost recovery of oil, then they had incentives to win this concession from 
the gas-cap owners, and the expected extra profits financed the trade. One typical 
concession was to offer the gas-cap owners a reduced share in oil rim development costs.  
Unfortunately, this negotiating process was vulnerable to break down, especially in cases 
where  the  parties  held  disparate  expectations  regarding the relative values of reservoir 
                                                           
35 Since the main impediments to unitization appear to result from asymmetries in resource holdings and 
information, it is reasonable to ask (as Dean Lueck has done) whether it would not be more effective to 
unitize the many small holdings into one consolidated tract prior to exploration.  Certainly there is less 
asymmetry among the parties at that point.  However, there remains the problem of holdouts and 
bargaining over shares.  Given that only about one in ten exploration wells results in discovery of a 
commercial reservoir, one may doubt whether it would be worthwhile to incur the transactions costs of 
forming a unit before the need for it has been clearly established.  
36 Libecap and Smith, Self-Enforcing Provisions, supra note 5.        18
fluids.  Any side agreement formulated to balance the interests of the owners was 
precarious because the process of unitization was itself incomplete. The deal could 
unravel if there were any significant economic shocks to prices or costs that altered the 
net values of the two fluids.  
Suppose the owners agreed that gas sales would not begin until 30 percent of the 
oil had been recovered from the reservoir, and as compensation the gas-cap owners were 
granted a disproportionately low cost-sharing obligation in the oil rim.  This exchange 
was based on expectations regarding the cost to gas-cap owners of delaying gas sales.  If 
those expectations subsequently changed, the basis for the exchange would be lost. For 
instance, if there were an unexpected, post-agreement surge in natural gas prices or a 
geological reassessment that subsequently increased the estimated volume of the gas 
deposit, then the provisions of the original contract would appear to the gas-cap owners 
as inadequate compensation for their sacrifice. 
  In Union Pacific Resources Company v. Texaco, Inc. (882 P.2d 212; 1994 Wyo. 
LEXIS 111) the reassessment of reserves in two distinct participating areas had just this 
effect, triggering demands by some owners that their contractual shares in the respective 
participating areas be renegotiated. This conflict stemmed from the fact, as recognized by 
the Court, that “the allocation of profit varies depending upon the geologic formation 
from which production is achieved.”  Although the partitioned unit agreement achieved 
an initial balancing of interests, it failed to permanently align the interests of all owners, 
as a complete unitization agreement would do.  The words of the Court are instructive: 
However, even plainly stated terms may be the subject of significant 
disputes.  The parties to the Operating Agreement are sophisticated 
corporate entities with considerable experience in forming these types of 
agreements.  The parties also understand that their business involves a        19
highly regulated industry.  Despite these skills, the parties failed to 
anticipate the likelihood that a basic fact on which their agreement was 
premised might change. 
 
The potential for such conflicts of interest, opportunism, re-contracting, and 
outright abrogation were the prices paid for the creation of separate competing property 
rights within the same reservoir.  The benefit of partitioned units was to enable some kind 
of cooperative agreement, albeit incomplete, in lieu of extractive anarchy (as moderated 
by state conservation regulations).
37   
  The recent increase in volatility of relative oil and natural gas prices, as indicated 
in Figure 3, suggests that it is now more difficult for owners to maintain balance between 
the bundles of competing property rights that have traditionally been created within 
partitioned units.
38 With wider and more frequent swings in relative prices, the scope for 
opportunistic behavior and the reward for abrogation of agreements increase.  At some 
point, the cost of bundling property rights into separate partitions within the reservoir 
may exceed the benefit.  As that becomes the case, either complete unitization or reliance 
on less effective state regulation, if no unit agreement can be reached, will become a 
more common industry practice. 
The Prudhoe Bay oil and gas field in Alaska is a case in point, and notable for 
being the largest petroleum reservoir ever discovered in North America.  At the time of 
discovery (1968), and due to the field’s remote location and lack of transport facilities, it 
was debatable whether or when the huge gas reserve could be  developed  for commercial  
                                                           
37 For a more sympathetic view of rule-of-capture competition and less favorable interpretation of 
regulatory intervention as a source of overproduction and overdrilling, see Bradley, supra note 18, at 
chapter 3. 
38 The rise of OPEC and deregulation have combined to make oil and gas prices the least predictable of any 
major commodity.          20
sale, instead of remaining in the ground to maintain pressure and assist in the production 
of oil.  Because the gas was distributed unevenly beneath the various leases and its value 
was highly speculative, the owners negotiated in vain over eight years to find terms of 
trade that would give to each party a fixed share of the aggregate resources in the 
reservoir. The oil rim owner (BP) was unwilling to accept any of the risky gas resource in 
exchange for the oil lying beneath its leases.  Terms of the agreement finally reached in 
1977 called for the field to be partitioned into separate oil rim and gas cap participating 
areas, with varying shares allocated to each owner.  BP, for example, was allocated 51 
percent of the oil rim, but only 14 percent of the gas cap.  For their part, the principal gas 
cap owners (ARCO and Exxon) obtained BP’s agreement to a series of trades regarding 
field operations that involved, among other things, the timing of gas sales from the 
reservoir.
39  At that point, the field was declared by the owners and the Alaska Oil and 
Gas Conservation Commission to have been “unitized.” 
Neither gas nor oil prices behaved after 1977 in the manner anticipated by the 
parties, and the unanticipated swings brought economic pressures that caused the initial 
balance between competing interests to fail.  Because the separate reservoir fluids had not 
been pooled, the field had been unitized in name only.  Although the gas cap owners 
became residual claimants to gas cap profits and oil rim owners became residual 
claimants to oil rim profits, none of the parties had been made a residual claimant to a 
fixed share in unit-wide profits.  Thus, the creation of competing participating areas 
within the same field brought conflicts of interest, opportunistic behavior, arbitration, and 
litigation over h ow the reserve would be developed.  The original unit operating 
                                                           
39 Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, Transcript of Public Hearing Re: Prudhoe Bay Unit—
Liquid/Miscible Natural Gas Injectant, April 12, pp. 238, 289, 951-956 (1996).          21
agreement was significantly amended on at least seven occasions during the 1980s and 
1990s as individual conflicts were settled on a piecemeal basis.   
Most of the disputed issues pertained to the disposition of produced gas and the 
allocation of costs between participating areas.  ARCO and Exxon, for example, favored 
processing any gas that was produced in association with oil to extract as much natural 
gas liquids (NGL) as could be blended with crude oil for shipment and sale down the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline.  BP favored instead converting the NGLs into a miscible fluid that 
could be reinjected into the reservoir to enhance the recovery of remaining oil.
40  Oil 
production from this massive field actually began to decline in 1988. This was not due to 
physical depletion of the underlying oil deposit, but to a lack of agreement on which 
parties would pay for facilities required to handle the rising volume of gas that was 
produced along with oil as the field matured.
41 
Disputes regarding the management of this “unitized” field came repeatedly 
before State officials, including the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission 
(AOGCC), the Alaska Public Utilities Commission, and the Alaska Superior Court.  
Despite a series of adjustments to the unit operating agreement and a re-balancing of 
interests that each adjustment produced, conflicts continued.  Finally, in 1995 the 
AOGCC opened public hearings on the underlying causes and deleterious effects of the 
partition between gas cap and oil rim interests, and on possible courses of corrective 
                                                           
40 Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, Conservation Order No. 360, paragraphs 73-74, Aug. 9, 
1995. 
41 D. J. Szabo and K. O. Myers, Prudhoe Bay: Development History and Future Potential, Paper No. 26053, 
Society of Petroleum Engineers (1993).        22
action, including compulsory re-unitization of the field by the State of Alaska, if 
necessary.
42 
  The owners strongly resisted this attempt at compulsory unitization and finally 
succeeded in winning a ruling from the State Attorney General that denied jurisdiction to 
the AOGCC on grounds that the agency had already recognized the oil field as having 
been unitized in 1977.  Thus, although the partitions were the source of underlying 
economic conflicts, they were declared legally irrelevant. Even so, the owners needed to 
more effectively unitize the field to deal with their overlapping claims and conflicting 
bundles of property rights.  This course was seen as more durable and less costly than a 
continuing series of lawsuits and regulatory filings.  The first public indication of their 
efforts came in 1999 when BP effected a buy-out of ARCO’s interest in the Prudhoe Bay 
field by agreeing to purchase the entire company.
43  The Federal Trade Commission 
temporarily blocked this transaction on anti-trust grounds, but an even more 
comprehensive alternative was found.  Phillips Petroleum purchased the ARCO stake in 
the Prudhoe Bay field and a new exchange of interests between all remaining owners 
dissolved the partition between the oil rim and gas cap and created for each owner a fixed 
share in the operations of the entire field.  This action completely unitized Prudhoe Bay, 




                                                           
42 Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, Conservation Order No. 360, supra note 39. 
43 According to the Atlantic Richfield Co. 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Alaska accounted for 51% of ARCO’s worldwide petroleum production in 1999, the last full year prior to 
the sale.        23
IV.  THE PROBLEM OF COMPULSORY UNITIZATION. 
  As we have noted, because of the problems encountered in negotiating private 
unitization agreements, state governments often resorted to compulsory unitization as a 
remedy for the common pool externality. Depending on the standards by which 
compulsory unitization is implemented, the procedure can restrict the owners’ rights to 
voluntarily negotiate and adopt operating agreements that fall short of the state’s criteria. 
As Demsetz argued, restricting the range of private negotiations in this fashion imposes 
infinite transaction costs on certain trades and is likely to create inefficiency.
44 
  Compulsory unitization can have this effect if it overrides a voluntary agreement 
that has been crafted on the basis of the anticipated costs and benefits of its various 
provisions.  The state may impose a unit in cases where voluntary agreements appear to 
fall short of complete unitization. But welfare can be reduced by such action. Above we 
noted that when it is difficult for the parties to trade the rights to the resources in situ and 
completely unitize, less complete separate participating areas and related Coasian trades 
may still move the parties away from extractive anarchy.  In situations where complete 
unitization of the reservoir would not satisfy the criterion of Pareto efficiency, due to 
either disparate expectations or constraints on the distribution of risk among the owners, 
any state imposed unitization necessarily results in efficiency losses on at least some of 
the owners.  Accordingly, the welfare effects of compulsory unitization are not 
unambiguous. 
  There is a paradox, however. While actually invoking the power of compulsory 
unitization  can   lead  to  inefficiency, the  threat  of  invoking  that   power  may  reduce   
                                                           
44 Demsetz, supra note 1, at 348-49.        24
bargaining costs if it mitigates the holdout problem. But, for the threat to be effective, it 
has to be credible, which requires the state to follow through with compulsory unitization 
at least in some cases. Indeed, the value of the threat stems at least in part because it 
imposes an inefficient outcome on the owners, which they wish to avoid. It would be a 
mistake, then, for the state to automatically reject a voluntary agreement made by the 
owners, regardless of its apparent limitations.
45 To do so ignores the full costs of making 
the transaction, all of which fall on the owners of the reservoir.  It is at least as much in 
their interests as it is in the state’s to craft an agreement that will maximize the value of 
the reservoir.  The state can perhaps contribute to their success by adopting measures 
(including compulsory unitization) that reduce the power of holdouts, but not by 
requiring perfection of the agreement that results. 
  There are indications, beyond Alaska, that the regulatory agencies and courts 
might ignore, or fail to recognize, the burden that compulsory unitization can impose on 
the owners.  The overriding principle of conservation and avoidance of waste has been 
used to impose mandatory unitization plans on unwilling parties.  In Clark Oil Producing 
Co. v. Donald P. Hodel, Etc., et. al. (667 F. Supp. 281; 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7694; 97 
Oil & Gas Rep. 291) for example, the Court found that under federal law governing oil 
and gas leases on the outer continental shelf, a mandatory plan could be imposed over the 
opposition of any owner if the regulation avoided the drilling of “unnecessary” wells.  
This ruling begs the question of which wells should be deemed unnecessary, particularly 
if the owners themselves could not reach agreement on an issue that would directly 
reduce costs and increase their profits.  Under federal law, however, there is apparently 
                                                           
45 Compulsory unitization is a measure to be invoked only if the private negotiations fail to produce a 
voluntary agreement within a reasonable time.        25
no requirement that the mandated plan have a favorable, or at least neutral, impact on the 
welfare of each affected owner.  This position is consistent with the traditional view that 
unitization has the potential to increase overall reservoir rents, and therefore could 
enhance the welfare of each individual owner.  The arguments made here, however, 
suggest unitization may not be welfare enhancing, at least when set against other 
voluntary alternatives available to the owners.  Accordingly, proper public policy is not 
so obvious.  Kansas is one state that does look to the welfare implications, requiring that 
mandated unitization provide “fair and equitable” treatment of all interest owners, and 
accepting the partial unitization of a common pool if there will be no material adverse 
effect upon other parts of the pool.
46  More than anything else, this stance reflects the fact 
that, with or without unitization, imperfections in the definition and trading of property 
rights to oil and gas exist.  It is therefore important for regulators to recognize that an 
apparent second best solution, voluntarily reached, may be preferable to mandated 
unitization.  
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS. 
  In this paper, we have followed the gradual development of property rights to 
subsurface oil and gas deposits in the United States through private and political 
negotiations.  The pattern has been influenced by technological change, shifts in relative 
prices,  information asymmetries, and political factors. The process generally has 
followed the process suggested by Harold Demsetz in 1967.  We show, however, that the 
unpredictability of relative oil and gas prices limited the arrangements that could be 
voluntarily adopted to address the common pool externality.  In cases where there were 
                                                           
46 See, for example, Cleon Parkin, et. al., v. The State Corporation Commission of Kansas, et. al. (234 Kan. 
994; 677 P.2d 991; 1984 Kan. LEXIS 276; 80 Oil & Gas Rep. 39).        26
both oil and gas in large quantities in a reservoir negotiations were especially difficult 
because of volatile prices, disparate expectations, and the owners’ need to manage 
financial risk as well as reservoir behavior.  Units often could not be completed, or when 
they were, unit agreements often did not completely align incentives.  To address 
differences in perceived values for natural gas and oil, units were partitioned into 
different participating areas or PA s with the majority of oil owners in one PA and the 
majority of natural gas owners in another.  Once again, these units were an improvement 
over competitive extraction, but conflicting incentives led to production disagreements 
and coordination problems.  The history of the Prudhoe Bay Unit illustrates the problems 
that can be encountered when there are gas cap and oil rim partitions. 
Partitioned units are associated with litigation and other forms of waste, and states 
have used coercive unitization statutes to force a unit agreement once a fixed majority 
agreed to the action.  As we have argued, although forced unitization has been viewed 
positively as a means of addressing the common pool externality, it can reduce the 
welfare of parties relative to private agreements.  The policy implication is that coercive 
unitization should be used sparingly, perhaps in cases when no private agreements are 
forthcoming after lengthy negotiations.      27 
 
 
Table 1:  The Frequency of Partitioned Units 
 
Total Observations = 60  With Multi-Phase Partition  No Multi-Phase Partition 
With Dual PA partition  3  11 
No Dual PA partition  19  27 
 
Source:  Gary D. Libecap and James L. Smith, The Self-Enforcing Provisions of Oil and Gas Unit 















Figure 1: Divergent Expectations Block Unitization 
 
Figure 2: Risk Aversion Blocks Unitization 
 
Figure 3: Increasing Volatility of Relative Prices (Oil/Gas) 
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Source: U.S. Energy  Information Administration
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